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Abstract
In platform-component systems with indirect network eﬀects, some components are
so popular with consumers that they have strong bargaining positions and can be
regarded as “must-have” from the point of view of the platform. For example,
ESPN is a must-have component of cable TV platforms. This paper presents a
theoretical model to assess how platform market structures aﬀect the likelihood of
exclusive versus non-exclusive contracts between platforms and components. The
model evaluates the combined impacts of (i) the popularity of the component, (ii)
the platform market share diﬀerence and (iii) platform technological compatibility
on the platform-component contractual arrangements. It shows that a component
provider is more likely to sign exclusive access contracts with a single platform if
its popularity is high, the platform market share diﬀerence is large, and platform
compatibility is low.
JEL classiﬁcation: L14, L22, L82
Keywords: network eﬀects, bargaining, platforms
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Many products operate on the platform-component model. The broader the con-
sumer choice of components is, the greater utility consumers can derive from the
platform. This creates indirect network eﬀects and a two-sided market. Due to
superior technologies and well-known brand names, certain component providers
have tremendous power in aﬀecting the platform market. Examples of such “must-
have” component providers include ESPN in the US pay-TV market, Squaresoft in
the Japanese video game market and short messaging services (SMS) in the Chi-
nese cell phone market.1 These component providers typically bargain with the
platforms in deciding the nature of platform-component contractual arrangements.
Research interest in this type of industry has heightened recently, but we believe
this is the ﬁrst model to combine (i) strategic competition between platforms, (ii)
diﬀerentiated “must-have” components, and (iii) bargaining between platforms and
component providers.
Theoretical research on indirect network eﬀects can be divided into two broad
categories, namely the traditional platform-component literature and the emerging
two-sided networks literature. Chou and Shy (1990, 1993 and 1996) and Church and
Gandal (1992, 1993 and 2000) made signiﬁcant early contributions to the platform-
component literature. They analyzed how indirect network eﬀects aﬀect the number
of components on each platform. Typically there are asymmetric market equilibria
where competing platforms do not have equal market shares and are not supported
1The expression “must-have” is used to mean “very important,” but does not imply perfect
complementarity. For perfect complements, Matutes and Regibeau (1988) show diﬀerent results
from those presented here.
2by the same number of components.
The two-sided networks literature (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Armstrong 2004)
emphasizes that indirect network eﬀects present a chicken-and-egg problem. On
the one hand, it is the number of components rather than the size of the installed
customer base that attracts a given consumer to purchase a platform. On the
other hand, the size of the installed customer base determines how many component
providers there are to join a given platform. In a two-sided network, platforms try to
get the two sides of end-users on board by appropriately charging each side. In order
to coordinate the demand between components and consumers, the platform often
chooses one side of the market (e.g., video game developers) as the proﬁt center and
the other side (e.g., gamers) as the loss leader.
The focus of the present paper is on platform-component contractual arrange-
ments when some components have substantial bargaining power. Katz and Shapiro
(1994) discuss the importance of quality diﬀerentiation among components. Har-
bord and Ottaviani (2002) model premium programming in the UK pay-TV market,
and Rochet and Tirole (2003) model bargaining between end-users and component
providers. In general most network models focus on homogeneous components.
We deﬁne a must-have component as one that commands more than ordinary
inﬂuence on platform sales and possesses signiﬁcant bargaining power vis-` a-vis plat-
forms. A must-have component stands in contrast to basic components, which have
no bargaining power. We model a must-have component provider’s incentive to oﬀer
exclusive or non-exclusive access contracts to platforms under diﬀerent technological
and market regimes. The superior development technologies and the brand names
enjoyed by a few prestigious component providers translate into considerable bar-
3gaining power. For instance, the departure of a small video game developer would
have insigniﬁcant eﬀects on Nintendo’s overall market share, but the loss of Square-
soft’s exclusive support cost Nintendo its dominant position in the Japanese video
game industry. The US pay-TV market has also witnessed increasing bargaining
power of Disney’s ESPN in fee negotiations with pay-TV operators.
In section 2, we describe the model. In section 3 we add bargaining between the
platforms and the components, and in section 4 we evaluate whether a must-have
component should oﬀer an exclusive or non-exclusive contract. We compare the
model to three mini case studies in section 5, and conclude in section 6.
2 The Model
We base our model on Cr´ emer, Rey and Tirole (2000) (hereafter CRT) and a later
analysis of CRT by Malueg and Schwartz (2002). CRT model two Internet back-
bone providers competing to provide connections to many Internet service providers
(ISPs). If the IBPs are not interconnected themselves, there is a direct network
eﬀect between the various ISPs all connected to one backbone, and the number of
ISPs determines the number of customers of each backbone. If the backbones are
interconnected (at varying quality levels), the direct network eﬀect is expanded to
the ISPs connected to the other backbone. CRT show that the larger backbone may
not want to interconnect with the smaller one.
The CRT model is a good basis for our work because it includes strategic behav-
ior by the platforms (the backbones) and partial compatibility between them (the
quality of interconnection). We reinterpret the direct network eﬀect in the CRT
model as a reduced form version of an indirect network eﬀect. Clements (2004) has
4pointed out that a direct network eﬀects model can be viewed as a reduced form of
an indirect network eﬀects model. Following Rohlfs (2003), we translate the degree
of interconnection into the degree of compatibility in the indirect network industries.
We then introduce the must-have component and analyze how it aﬀects the equilib-
rium sales, prices and proﬁtability of competing platforms. The analysis will cover
two cases: (i) the must-have component provider signs an exclusive contract with
one of the platforms, and (ii) the must-have component provider signs non-exclusive
contracts with both platforms.
There are two platforms, i = 1,2, competing to gain access to basic compo-
nents. The two platforms have installed customer bases of β1 and β2 respectively,
where β1 ≥ β2 ≥ 0. Following Malueg and Schwartz’s (2002) analysis of CRT, we
assume that β = β1 + β2 = 1. The two platforms’ initial market share diﬀerence
is thus ∆1 = −∆2 = β1 − β2 ≥ 0. Each platform tries to enroll new customers qi,
and the population of new customers q1 + q2 equals 1. Analogous to the degree of
interconnection in the CRT model, we deﬁne θ ∈ [0,1] as the degree of compati-
bility between the two platforms. Compatibility is understood as the technological
constraints that component providers face when transferring the same components
from one platform to another.2
The number of basic components on platform i is proportional to its eﬀective
user base: Ni = s[(βi + qi) + θ(βj + qj)]. As in CRT, we restrict 0 < s < 1/2 to
ensure stability and avoid tipping eﬀects in the platform market. For simplicity,
2For example, the degree of compatibility between two video game consoles is usually deter-
mined by the programming environments of the consoles. If two consoles adopt the same software
development system (e.g., Windows), then game developers will incur very low costs when they
convert the same games from one console to another.
5a consumer’s utility from purchasing a platform is equivalent to the number of
basic components available on that platform, i.e., Ui = Ni + τ. We use this linear
utility function in order to obtain a closed-form solution for the entire model.3
Diﬀerent values of s can be used to parameterize the utility function. The uniformly
distributed taste parameter τ ∈ [0,1] indicates that some consumers prefer one
platform to another. Both platforms have the same marginal cost of production
c. Malueg and Schwartz (2002) pointed out that it makes sense to restrict c ≤ 1
to ensure that there will be at least some new customer enrolment, no matter how
small the value of s is.
In addition to the Ni basic components, there may be certain components that
enjoy enormous popularity among the consumers. To capture this, we introduce the
must-have component and deﬁne µ (a constant) as the marginal utility consumers
derive from the must-have component. We ﬁrst assume platform 1 has exclusive
access to the must-have component. For consumers who purchase platform 1, their
gross utility function becomes U1 = s[(β1 + q1) + θ(β2 + q2)] + µ + τ .
The two platforms compete ` a la Cournot in the game described by CRT. Given
β1, β2 and θ, both platforms maximize proﬁts based on their choices of qi. For
platform 1, the proﬁt function is
πE
1 = [1 + s(β1 + θβ2) − (1 − s)q1 − (1 − θs)q2 + µ − c]q1
where the E denotes platform 1’s exclusive access to the must-have component. For
platform 2, the proﬁt function is
πE0
2 = [1 + s(β2 + θβ1) − (1 − s)q2 − (1 − θs)q1 − c]q2
3We believe that non-linear utility functions would not change the comparative static results.
6where E0 denotes that there is exclusive access but that platform 2 is the one that
is excluded.
Taking ﬁrst order conditions and solving simultaneously gives a Cournot equi-










2(1 − c) + s(1 + θ)β
2(1 − s) + (1 − θs)
+
(1 − θ)s∆1
2(1 − s) − (1 − θs)

is the “basic component eﬀect” and is identical to the solution in the CRT model.
It represents the underlying eﬀect of basic components excluding the must-have
component. The eﬀect of the must-have component is contained in the term
mE(θ,µ) =
2µ(1 − s)
[2(1 − s) + (1 − θs)][2(1 − s) − (1 − θs)]
(1)
which is positive indicating that platform 1 gains from its exclusive access.
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[2(1 − s) + (1 − θs)][2(1 − s) − (1 − θs)]
(2)




∂θ > 0. A higher degree of
compatibility increases the number of basic components and thus consumer utility




∂θ < 0. This implies that
platform 1’s initial market share advantage (as reﬂected by β1 ≥ β2) fades away if
the platforms become more compatible. A higher degree of compatibility tends to
equalize the number of basic components on the two platforms.
The novelty of the must-have component model lies in the must-have component
quantity eﬀects mE(θ,µ) and mE0
(θ,µ). We now turn to some comparative statics
results in this augmented model.







[2(1−s)+(1−θs)][2(1−s)−(1−θs)]. Given 0 < s < 1/2 and θ ∈ [0,1]
then 1 − 2s + θs > 0 and [2(1 − s) + (1 − θs)][2(1 − s) − (1 − θs)] > 0.
The gain in the total market demand, however, does not beneﬁt platform 2
since it has no access to the must-have component. The exclusive contract between
platform 1 and the must-have component provider makes platform 2 worse oﬀ.
Proposition 2 If the must-have component gains popularity, then it increases plat-
form 1’s sales but reduces platform 2’s sales.












Taken together, propositions 1 and 2 indicate that platform 2’s declining sales
(due to denied access to the must-have component) are partly oﬀset by the positive
impact associated with the rising number of basic component providers.
The must-have component aﬀects equilibrium platform prices in the same direc-
8tion as it aﬀects the sales. The equilibrium prices of the two platforms are
pE
1 = pB
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1 − (1 − θs)qB
2
pB
2 = 1 + s(β2 + θβ1) − (1 − s)qB









µ(1 − s)(1 − θs)
[2(1 − s) + (1 − θs)][2(1 − s) − (1 − θs)]
(4)
The terms gE(θ,µ)and gE0
(θ,µ) are the must-have component price eﬀects.
Proposition 3 Platform 1’s equilibrium price increases in the must-have compo-













































































1 is the increase in operating proﬁt on platform 1 as a result of exclusive access
to the must-have component. HE0
2 is the decrease in operating proﬁt on platform 2
as a result of denied access to the must-have component.
9Proposition 4 Increasing popularity of the must-have component has a positive
eﬀect on platform 1’s operating proﬁt and a negative eﬀect on platform 2’s operating




























Changes in compatibility, such as platform standardization (equivalent to an
increase in θ) or platform diﬀerentiation (equivalent to a decrease in θ), inﬂuence
the market equilibria.
Proposition 5 A higher degree of compatibility weakens the must-have component
price and quantity eﬀects on the platform that has exclusive access to the must-have
component. It works the opposite way on the platform that is denied access. The
eﬀects are larger in magnitude on platform 1.







∂θ < 0, and
∂gE0
(θ,µ)


































While the must-have component works to widen the market share diﬀerence
between the competing platforms, a higher level of compatibility serves to narrow
such a diﬀerence. Therefore, compatibility and the must-have component eﬀects
exert opposite inﬂuences on equilibrium platform sales and prices.
We can extend the must-have component model to two other cases where the
must-have component provider grants (i) exclusive access to platform 2 and (ii) non-
exclusive access to both platforms. In the non-exclusive access case, both platforms
enjoy increases in sales and operating proﬁts. (Refer to the Appendix for derivations
for these two cases.) The following table summarizes the equilibrium operating
10proﬁts for the two platforms under three diﬀerent access regimes.






















While the must-have component provider is crucial to platform competition, the
platforms command considerable bargaining power as well. Ultimately, the must-
have component provider needs at least one platform as its bridge to consumers.
In this section we investigate the contractual arrangements between the platforms
and the must-have component provider. Speciﬁcally, if the must-have component
pays the platforms transfer payments Ti, how do the popularity of the must-have
component (µ), the initial market share diﬀerence (∆1 = β1 − β2), and the level
of compatibility (θ) aﬀect the transfer payment? Under what circumstances are
exclusive access contracts between a single platform and the must-have component
provider more likely to exist?
We use the Nash bargaining solution to model negotiation between the platforms
and the must-have component. We assume neither time preferences for the negoti-
ating parties nor exogenous risk of breakdown of the bargaining process. According
to Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), if the negotiating parties engage in
the dynamic strategic game, these assumptions would lead them to split evenly the
net payoﬀ resulting from their cooperation (i.e., the diﬀerence between the gross
payoﬀ and the outside opportunity). This cooperative approach does not prevent us
11from capturing the strategic decisions that exist in the platform market. Since the
outside opportunities available to the negotiating parties depend upon the nature of
competition in the platform market, strategic competition in the platform market
is fully reﬂected in the outcome of the negotiation.
Two bargaining scenarios are described here. First, we analyze simultaneous
bargaining with exclusive access, where the must-have component provider bar-
gains simultaneously with platform 1 and platform 2 and makes a credible, ex ante
commitment to being exclusive. Second, we consider simultaneous bargaining with
non-exclusive access.
3.1 Simultaneous Bargaining with Exclusive Access
Let TE
i be the transfer payment that the must-have component provider makes to
any platform that has exclusive access to the must-have component. If the transfer
payment goes from the platform to the must-have component provider, then TE
i is
negative. If platform 1 signs an exclusive contract with the must-have component
provider, then its payoﬀ is equal to HE
1 +TE
1 , the sum of the rise in operating proﬁts
and the transfer payment. If it loses the must-have component to platform 2, it will
suﬀer from lower sales and lower prices. This outside opportunity is equivalent to
HE0
1 . Platform 2’s payoﬀ is HE
2 + TE
2 and its outside opportunity is HE0
2 .
As for the must-have component provider, we assume its operating proﬁt to
be a function of the total customer base on a chosen platform: πiE
µ = γ(βi + qE
i )
in the exclusive access case, or πNE
µ = γ(β + qNE
1 + qNE
2 ) in the non-exclusive
access case. The constant γ > 0 represents per-subscriber income that the must-
have component provider receives directly from the customer base.4 Therefore, if
4A component provider’s per-subscriber income can take the forms of fees, advertising revenues
12the must-have component provider exclusively supports platform 1, then its payoﬀ
function Π1E




1 . On the other hand, an exclusive contract with platform 2 allows




Under the simultaneous bargaining assumption, the two transfer payments, i.e.,
TE
1 and TE
2 , are decided in the same period. As Shaked and Sutton (1984) point
out, we can think of the simultaneous bargaining process as if the time taken to
formulate successive proposals is negligibly small. Therefore, the bargaining out-
come is independent of “who calls ﬁrst.” There are also two important constraints




1 ≥ 0 and HE
2 + TE
2 − HE0
2 ≥ 0. Otherwise, it is not worthwhile for
the platforms to contract with the must-have component provider.
The simultaneous bargaining process implies that when platform 1 and the must-
have component provider bargain, they take TE
2 as given. The same applies to
the negotiation between platform 2 and the must-have component provider. The
equilibrium TE







and sales of associated products. We assume that γ is not dependent on µ. The reason for this
assumption is that a component provider’s ability to directly charge customers usually depends on
the existing state of technology and/or the industrial business model. For example, the TV broad-
casting technology limits content providers’ ability to receive direct payment from the viewers. On
the other hand, the single game pricing scheme in the video game industry allows game developers
to charge customers directly. If γ were directly associated with µ, then the comparative static result
of ∂Ti/∂µ in the following analysis would change.
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It turns out that the simultaneous solution violates the net payoﬀ constraint for





































The corner solution for platform 2 gives us an interesting result:
Proposition 6 Under simultaneous bargaining with exclusive access, a platform
with a smaller installed customer base would always need to pay to get an exclusive
contract with the must-have component provider.
It is worthwhile to point out if γ = 0, then platform 1’s payment TE
1 is also
negative. That is to say, if the must-have component does not charge customers
directly, it will always get a subsidy from the platform. Such is the case in the




2 , the must-have component decides which platform to contract
with by evaluating Π1E
µ (TE
1 ) and Π2E
µ (TE
2 ). We can calculate Πµ(TE












1 ) − 1
2(HE
2 − HE0
2 ) > 0, so the must-have
component provider will always choose to contract with platform 1.
We can now evaluate the eﬀect of changes in the parameters on the transfer
payment. An increase in µ enhances the must-have component quantity and price
eﬀects, which in turn raises the must-have component provider’s bargaining power.
Hence, the must-have component provider is in a position to make a lower transfer
payment to platform 1.
Proposition 7 Under the simultaneous bargaining with exclusive access scenario,
the must-have component provider makes a smaller transfer payment to platform 1


























If the two platforms are more similar in starting size (lower ∆1), platform 1 has
less to gain from the bargaining process, and the must-have component provider
has a larger outside opportunity. The must-have component provider thus makes a
smaller transfer payment.
Proposition 8 For ﬁxed total starting market size β, the larger the initial plat-
form market share diﬀerence, the higher the transfer payment from the must-have
component provider to platform 1.
Proof: See appendix.
The limiting case of proposition 8 is when β1 = β2. When the two platforms
are equal sized, they are essentially undiﬀerentiated, and they engage in Bertrand




15i.e. platform 1 pays the must-have component provider its entire gain from having
exclusive access. Thus with equal-sized platforms, the must-have component can
capture all the rents, and the winning platform gets a net payoﬀ of zero. The
smaller ∆1, the more closely platform competition resembles Bertrand competition,
allowing the must-have component provider to play one platform against the other.
The level of technological compatibility has ambiguous eﬀects on the transfer
payment. First, a higher level of compatibility expands the overall platform market
(as shown by CRT). This increases the must-have component provider’s opportunity
cost of going exclusive on platform 1. Second, a higher level of compatibility also
weakens platform 1’s initial market advantage (also shown by CRT). But third, a
higher degree of compatibility weakens the must-have component price and quantity
eﬀects (Proposition 5), thus negatively aﬀecting the must-have component provider’s
bargaining power. As a result, the net impact of a change in the level of compatibility
on the transfer payment is ambiguous, unless we can specify in advance the relative
strengths of these three eﬀects.
Proposition 9 A higher level of compatibility reduces the bargaining power of both
the platform and the must-have component provider. Therefore, the net eﬀect of
changing compatibility on the transfer payment is uncertain.
Proof: See Appendix.
For example, in a mature platform market where both platforms have accumu-
lated substantial subscriber bases, the basic component expansion eﬀect and the
platform diﬀerentiation eﬀect associated with a higher level of compatibility would
be limited. Thus, in a mature market we expect that a higher level of compatibility
would reduce the must-have component provider’s bargaining power relative to the
16platforms. In a growing market, the basic component eﬀect and platform diﬀer-
entiation eﬀect would probably be strong. We expect that in a growing market,
an increase in compatibility would increase the must-have component’s bargaining
power. Therefore, the must-have component provider would prefer low compatibility
in a mature market and high compatibility in a growing market.
3.2 Simultaneous Bargaining with Non-exclusive Access
The above bargaining analysis assumes that the must-have component provider is
committed to signing an exclusive access contract with only one of the platforms.
While we observe this type of contractual arrangement in certain industries, such as
the video game industry, non-exclusive access contracts are also prevalent in indirect
network markets. There are many ways to model non-exclusive bargaining; here we
focus on a process where the must-have component provider negotiates non-exclusive
contracts with the platforms while carrying the threat of going exclusive.5
As in the exclusive access case, we assume that the must-have component provider
bargains with the platforms simultaneously. If the must-have component fails to
reach an agreement with either platform, the bargaining stops and the must-have
provider initiates an exclusive negotiation. As shown in the previous section, the
exclusive contract with platform 1 is the must-have component provider’s best al-
ternative, so its payoﬀs become the outside options in this scenario.
From platform i’s perspective, the payoﬀ to a non-exclusive bargain is the
5We experimented with (i) simultaneous bargaining with no exit options and (ii) sequential
bargaining, but these do not give the must-have component as strong a threat as the process
we describe here. In these alternative structures, the weak bargaining position of the must-have
component guarantees that it is never advantageous to oﬀer a non-exclusive contract.
17proﬁt increase and the transfer payment: HNE
i + TNE
i (where NE denotes “non-
exclusive”). Platform 1’s outside opportunity is the payoﬀ function under the exclu-
sive scenario, HE
1 +TE
1 . For platform 2 the outside opportunity is the loss associated
with no access to the must-have component, HE0
2 .
If the non-exclusive negotiation is successful, the must-have component provider’s




2 . If it fails, the must-have component













































































































In the appendix we show that all of the comparative static results from the
exclusive case carry over to the non-exclusive case. Namely, TNE
1 + TNE
2 decreases
in µ, increases in ∆1 (for constant β), and changes ambiguously in θ.
4 Choosing Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Contracts
By comparing the results under the two bargaining scenarios, we can evaluate the
must-have component provider’s incentives to go exclusive or non-exclusive. The
18provider’s contractual decision will be based on the net payoﬀ diﬀerence between
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If this is positive, then the must-have component provider will sign non-exclusive
contracts with both platforms. Otherwise, the must-have component provider will go
exclusive on platform 1. The sign of ΠNE
µ −Π1E
µ is indeterminate. Therefore, we will
use two numerical examples to illustrate how the must-have component provider’s
contractual decision changes with respect to the variations in its popularity, µ,
and platform market share diﬀerence, ∆1. We investigate this question under two
compatibility regimes, incompatibility (θ = 0) and perfect compatibility (θ = 1).
We parameterize s = 0.25, c = 0.2 and γ = 0.5. With incompatibility (θ = 0),
tipping occurs if the platform that is denied access to the must-have component
cannot enroll any new subscribers. We limit consideration to values of µ that do




[2(1−s)+1−θs)][2(1−s)−(1−θs)] = 0. For our parameter values, ¯ µ = 0.4625 − 0.3125∆1.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between ΠNE
µ −Π1E
µ and µ with incompatibility.
Each curve has a unique upper bound on µ so as to avoid market tipping. Given ∆1,
it is more likely for the must-have component provider to go exclusive if µ increases.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that high µ enables the must-have component
provider to leverage its popularity and to demand a higher transfer payment.
Given µ, the must-have component provider is more likely to go exclusive when
∆1 is larger. In Figure 1, the ΠNE
µ − Π1E
µ curve shifts downward when ∆1 in-
creases. When ∆1 is large, the must-have component provider has less bargaining
power (Proposition 8). Oﬀering exclusive contracts gives the must-have component
19Figure 1: Contracts Under Incompatibility
an additional bargaining chip since it can induce the platforms into diﬀerentiated
Bertrand competition. Thus, oﬀering exclusive contracts to a high ∆1 platform
is actually a sign of weakness. When ∆1 goes to zero, the must-have component
provider will go non-exclusive for any value of µ. There exists a threshold ∆∗
1 such




Figure 2 shows the relationship between ΠNE
µ − Π1E
µ and µ with perfect com-
patibility (θ = 1). In this case, tupping occurs at µ = 21
20 regardless of ∆1. The
curves actually increase up to µ = 3
8, and decrease thereafter. As in the incompat-
ibility case, the curve shifts downward as ∆1 increases. Moreover, the must-have
component provider always goes non-exclusive under this set of parameters.
Comparing the ΠNE
µ − Π1E
µ functions under the two compatibility regimes re-
20Figure 2: Contracts Under Perfect Compatibility
veals how the must-have component provider’s contractual decision changes with
respect to θ. The must-have component provider goes non-exclusive if compatibility
is perfect. This theoretical result carries an interesting policy implication. In many
cases, government antitrust and regulatory authorities mandate open engineering
standards, adaptors and documentation to level the technological playing ﬁeld.6
Our model shows that there is an additional impact on the contractual arrangement
between the platforms and the must-have component provider. The likelihood that
the must-have component provider signs an exclusive contract will decrease, even
though the government policy may just expand compatibility among basic compo-
nents. In other words, a mandated perfect-compatibility regime may achieve the
same purpose of regulating the must-have component provider’s contractual choice.
6This was the focus of the antitrust case against Microsoft in the USA.
215 Case Studies
In this section we consider three mini case studies that illustrate the model. We
describe the US pay-TV market, the Japanese video game market, and the Chinese
text message market. For each case, we ﬁrst examine whether the contractual ar-
rangements between the platform(s) and the must-have component provider conﬁrm
the model predictions. We then use the results of the bargaining model to interpret
some industry events.
5.1 The US Pay-TV Market
Pay television programming (i.e. cable and satellite TV) reaches more than 80 mil-
lion households in the USA. The pay-TV industry consists of two types of businesses,
pay-TV operators and content providers. Pay-TV operators compete by purchas-
ing the rights to programs from content providers and then selling subscriptions
to viewers. Currently, pay-TV operators deliver programs through either cable or
satellite service.
The relationship between pay-TV operators and programming channels matches
the platform-component model. Content providers oﬀer highly diﬀerentiated pro-
gramming channels whose popularities diﬀer widely. Each pay-TV operator typically
carries more than 50 channels in its basic service package. Among these channels,
many have very small viewership and thus have practically no bargaining power in
negotiating fee arrangements with the pay-TV operators. They can be considered
basic components. Moreover, new programming channels compete ferociously for
the top pay-TV operator’s endorsement. For example, the programming investments
department at Comcast scans about 200 pitches from programming entrepreneurs
22each year.7 This fact is consistent with the basic component model where a bigger
platform has access to more basic components.
But certain content networks do receive high transfer payments from pay-TV
operators. Disney’s ESPN, in particular, enjoys tremendous bargaining power vis-
` a-vis pay-TV operators. ESPN alone accounts for more than 15% of Disney’s bottom
line and is valued by analysts between $15 billion and $20 billion.8 As of 2003, it
received an average fee of $1.76 per subscriber per month from pay-TV operators,
50% higher than its nearest rival.9
This two-tiered market suggests that ESPN (and some of the other very popular
cable channels) are must-have components. Any pay-TV operator without ESPN
will lose out in competition with other cable or satellite TV-operators. In fact,
the recent squabble between the pay-TV operators and Disney conﬁrms ESPN’s
the must-have component status. Relations between pay-TV operators and Disney
have been strained for years because of ﬁghts over how much Disney charges to carry
ESPN. The usually private grumbling became public in the fall of 2003, when Cox
publicly protested ESPN’s costs of access.10 Indeed, ESPN has had strong growth
in the per-subscriber fee it gets from pay-TV operators – about a 16% compound
annual growth rate since 1997.11
ESPN has long been oﬀering non-exclusive access contracts to pay-TV operators.
7George Anders, “Want to Start a TV Channel? See Amy Banse,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 19,
2004.
8Emily Nelson and Joe Flint, “Comcast’s Big Play for Micky,” Wall Street Journal, February
12, 2004.
9Kagan World Media, 2003.
10Peter Grant, “Cox to Blame Cable Sports for Rate Surge,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 2003.
11Chris Isidore, “ESPN Break Could Hurt Disney’s Appeal,” CNN Money, Feb. 23, 2004.
23The model implies that given its popularity, ESPN is more likely to oﬀer non-
exclusive contracts if (1) the market share diﬀerence among pay-TV operators is
small and (2) pay-TV operators are highly compatible. Both conditions are evident
in the US pay-TV market.
There are about 80 million cable subscribers in the USA. Philadelphia-based
Comcast is the largest cable operator in the USA, with over 22 million subscribers
at the end of 2003. All cable companies are facing increasing competition from
satellite TV. Newscorp’s satellite distribution network DirectTV and Echostar’s Dish
Network Satellite TV have been competing nationally against every cable company
in the country. Each had approximately 10 million subscribers at the end of 2003.12
Thus, of the 100 million pay-TV subscribers, cable has an 80% market share and
satellite a 20% share. Roughly speaking, this is consistent with ∆1 = 0.8−0.2 = 0.6.
The marginal cost for content providers to broadcast the same programs on
mulitple pay-TV operators is negligibly small. Therefore, the pay-TV operators are
highly compatibile with each other (high θ). Based on the results illustrated in
Figure 2, ESPN’s oﬀering of non-exclusive contracts is predicted by the model.
Since the late 1990s, the US media industry has witnessed a spate of conglom-
erate and horizontal mergers. The most dramatic deals involve Time merging with
Warner, buying Turner Broadcasting, and then selling itself to America Online.
Also noteworthy are Disney buying ABC, Viacom buying CBS, and Vivendi buying
Universal. Top pay-TV operators are inclined to go upstream and acquire premium
content networks. Under Rupert Murdoch’s leadership, News Corp has become the
most comprehensive pay-TV player, integrating satellite TV distribution DirecTV
12“Cable Vision,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 12, 2004.
24with the second most popular programming network Fox. Time Warner also unites
cable with television programming and ﬁlm studios. It has interests in TNT as well
as movie providers New Line Cinema and Warner Brothers Entertainment.
On February 11, 2004, Comcast made an unsolicited, hostile takeover bid for
Disney. The deal was valued on February 12, 2004 at $47.97 billion plus the as-
sumption of $11.9 billion in Disney debt.13 A combined Comcast-Disney would
have a market value of $125 billion and employ 179,000 people.14 The must-have
component model provides context to understand Comcast’s move.
Since their debuts, DirecTV and Dish Network Satellite TV have been expe-
riencing explosive expansion. After enjoying consecutive quarters of double-digit
growth rates, both operators had a combined subscriber base in excess of 20 million
in 2003. This increasingly competitive situation implies that ESPN is able to extract
better deals from Comcast. The reason is that the smaller is ∆1, the easier it is for
the must-have component provider to induce the platforms to enter Bertrand com-
petition. Hence, one motivation to propose a merger is to stop ESPN from playing
Comcast oﬀ against the satellite-TV operators in search of higher fees.
5.2 The Japanese Video Game Market
The structure of the video game industry nicely ﬁts the platform-component model,
where consoles are platforms and games are components. A large user base is crucial
for a console provider to get support from game developers. The abundance of game
titles and auxiliary products in turn leads to greater consumer utility and higher
console demand. Economic analysis of the video game industry has traditionally seen
13Joe Flint, “Why Comcast Covets ESPN,” Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2004.
14Nelson and Flint, ibid.
25games as being competitively supplied by game developers (Shankar and Bayus,
2002). Here we argue that certain games exert must-have component eﬀects on
console competition.
In the early 1980’s Nintendo, a small Japanese playing card manufacturer, pop-
ularized video games and brought millions of game consoles to households in Japan.
Nintendo ﬁrst released its Family Computer (hereafter FC15) in 1984 with the back-
ing of such in-house games as Donkey Kong and Mario Brothers. The unprecedented
success of the FC quickly transformed Nintendo into one of the most successful com-
panies in the history of Japan.16
During the 1980s, attempts by Sega and NEC to challenge Nintendo’s dominance
failed. In 1993 and 1994, Sega, Panasonic and Sony released new 32-bit game
consoles named Saturn, 3DO and Playstation (hereafter PS) respectively. Having
released its own system only 3 years earlier, Nintendo chose to delay the release of
its new game console, the 64-bit Nintendo 64 (hereafter N64), to 1996. However,
consumers grew impatient and started to purchase alternative consoles. Despite
its aggressive pre-sale advertising campaign, Nintendo lost its decade-long market
leadership in the Japanese video game industry. The N64 was a distant second to
the PS, never capturing more than 30% of the Japanese market.17
Console providers usually sell consoles as a loss leader in order to build up a
15The US version of FC was called Nintendo Entertainment System (NES).
16David Sheﬀ, Game Over: How Nintendo Zapped an American Industry, Captured Your Dollars,
and Enslaved Your Children (New York, 1993), p. 34.
17The most recent console war started in 1999, with Sega’s 128-bit Dreamcast, and now includes
Sony’s Playstation 2 (PS2), Microsoft’s Xbox, and Nintendo’s Gamecube. Neither Dreamcast nor
Xbox are strong contenders in the Japanese market, and the PS2 has been outselling the second-
place Gamecube at a 3:1 ratio.
26suﬃciently large customer base. Once a consumer acquires a console, he is captive
to that platform and can be induced to buy more games. Game licensing fees are the
primary source of revenue for console producers. An independent game developer
pays a royalty fee to a console provider for every unit of a game title sold.
In the Japanese video game market, Squaresoft’s Final Fantasy series enjoys
enormous popularity. Squaresoft started as a small game developer for Nintendo’s
FC in 1987. Over the next 17 years, Squaresoft’s distinct style of Role Playing
Games (in which players traverse virtual worlds, learn ﬁghting skills, and complete
a quest) revolutionized the nature of video games. They incorporate comprehensive
story lines into game play and became extraordinarily popular among Japanese
gamers. As a result, Squaresoft has sold 18 platinum games (games that sell more
than 1 million copies), half again as many as second-place Enix.18 Today, Squaresoft
is a multi-national entertainment corporation, standing on a par with the US game
giant Electronic Arts.
Squaresoft’s most popular series of games, known as Final Fantasy, has sold
23 million copies in Japan. Final Fantasy games have consistently outsold other
platinum games; for example the average sales volume of platinum games on the PS
was 1.49 million copies, while the PS Final Fantasy games VII, VIII, and IX) sold
3.28 million, 3.62 million and 2.86 million copies respectively.19
More important than the sales ﬁgures is Final Fantasy’s unique association with
the winning consoles in Japan. Nintendo’s FC and SFC and Sony’s PS and PS2
all enjoyed exclusive access to the Final Fantasy series. It is widely reckoned by
industry insiders that Squaresoft’s defection from Nintendo was vital to the success
18Square and Enix merged in 2003, strengthening their lead in the Japanese video game market.
19www.the-magicbox.com.
27of the PS. Figure 3 visualizes the “Final Fantasy eﬀect” on PS sales. It shows that
the growth rate of the PS sales climaxed following the release of Final Fantasy VII
in January 1997.
Figure 3: Cumulative Playstation Sales in Japan
Source: www.absolute-playstation.com/api faqs/faq20.htm
Indeed, 1997 should have been an extremely diﬃcult year for Sony as Nintendo
released the N64 in June 1996. Several N64 blockbuster games were released between
December 1996 and March 1997 in order to challenge the PS’s increasing popularity.
However, Final Fantasy VII sold nearly 3 million copies in January alone. One of
every two PS owners purchased Final Fantasy VII at that time.
Squaresoft has always oﬀered exclusive access contracts to the game consoles.
This means that each Squaresoft game is available on only one console in each gen-
eration. In the early 1990’s, while other game developers ﬂocked to Sega, Squaresoft
remained exclusive to Nintendo. Since the late 1990’s, Squaresoft has become ex-
clusive to Sony. Given the market and technological realities in the video game
28industry, Squaresoft’s decision to adopt exclusive contracts is consistent with the
theoretical model. First, the video game market has been characterized by large
market share diﬀerences, i.e., large ∆1. Historically, the console market quickly
tipped into one console in the early stage of competition. Second, the game consoles
are all incompatible with each other (low θ). Console incompatibility is reﬂected in
three aspects: storage, software, and game controllers. In storage, console providers
always choose to use diﬀerent means of storage. For example, in the 64-bit era, Sony
chose CD-ROM, but Nintendo used cartridges. In software, consoles adopt diﬀerent
development platforms for game developers, so converting a game from one console
to another requires game developers to re-code it. The diﬀerent game controllers of
the diﬀerent systems also make it more diﬃcult to port games from one platform
to another. As we have seen, high market share diﬀerences and low compatibility is
consistent with a must-have component provider’s decision to oﬀer exclusive access.
Squaresoft’s defection from Nintendo to Sony in 1996 was widely considered a
key factor in the ultimate success of the PS. Having helped Nintendo dominate
the Japanese video game market for more than a decade, Squaresoft announced
that it would forge an exclusive alliance with Sony in February 1996. The split
between Nintendo and Squaresoft was so bitter that Nintendo President Yamauchi
said he would refuse to work with Squaresoft forever.20 According to the oﬃcial
announcement, Squaresoft’s decision to switch to Sony was largely due to aesthetic
considerations. In a 1997 interview, Hironobu Sakaguchi, Squaresoft’s top game
designer, explained that Sony’s CD-ROM format allowed for more artistic freedom.
With the seemingly unlimited storage of CD-ROM, Sakaguchi was able to increase
20Steven L. Kent, The Ultimate History of Video Games (California: 2001), p.542.
29the artistic qualities of his games.21
While recognizing Squaresoft’s aesthetic concern, we also see a bargaining expla-
nation related to this storage issue. In the 32-bit era, there were two game console
storage media: Sony’s PS, Sega’s Saturn and Panasonic’s 3DO all took advantage of
the latest technology and adopted CD-ROM as the medium of storage. Nintendo,
on the other hand, stuck to the traditional cartridge as the medium of storage.
Due to limited storage space on the cartridge,22 full motion video and some special
sound eﬀects could not be produced on the N64. Developing N64 games also re-
quired game designers to use certain storage optimization techniques not applicable
to other CD-ROM-based consoles. Hence, it was almost technically impossible for
game developers to convert games between CD-ROM-based consoles and Nintendo’s
N64. This storage space issue, if interpreted in the theoretical framework, implies
that the video game industry would face a low-compatibility regime if the cartridge
format survived. Otherwise, higher compatibility, albeit imperfect, would exist in
video game industry.
The model showed that the must-have component provider makes a higher trans-
fer payment when compatibility is lower. That is to say, Squaresoft would end up
paying more royalty fees if it adopted the cartridge over the CD-ROM format. Thus,
it was logical for Squaresoft to abandon Nintendo and join the high-compatibility
regime. This bargaining explanation seems to be conﬁrmed by industry news. Al-
though there is no way to know the exact royalty fee arrangements between consoles
and game developers, some industry sources revealed that Nintendo charged about
$10 to $20-per-unit royalties on the sale of third-party games. This was compared
21Ibid., p.542.
22A CD-ROM can store 650MB of data, whereas a cartridge’s maximum capacity is 256MB.
30with $5 to $10-per-unit royalties for the PS.23
5.3 Short Message Service in China
Short message service (hereafter SMS) refers to the transmission of text messages
and other value-added services to and from mobile phones. The content of the text
messages is varied, ranging from commercial advertisements to sports game results.
The value-added services include downloadable ring tones, computer wallpaper, in-
teractive online games, and pop songs. Wireless phone carriers and SMS content
providers have a platform-component relationship. The explosive growth of SMS
usage has made SMS a must-have component for domestic cell phone carriers.
SMS gains its popularity in China primarily because it is a lot cheaper relative
to voice calls. Each message costs RMB0.10 (approximately US$0.012), whereas a
voice call costs RMB0.4 (approximately US$0.05) per minute.24 Internet portals
Netease, Sina, and Sohu constitute the main content providers of SMS. Launched
as web search engines in China in the late 1990s, Netease, Sina and Sohu are widely
recognized as China’s premier online brands. Their SMSs oﬀer a variety of content
through their phone-to-phone, phone-to-web, and web-to-phone interfaces. They
regularly conduct internal development and external acquisition of value-added ser-
vices. News updates, self-tailored wallpapers and new ring tones are extraordinarily
popular among Chinese cell phone subscribers. Recently released services include
colored text messages and short message dating services.
A cell phone subscriber simply needs to register her cell phone number with
the Internet portals and will be granted access to all the transferable content. The
23These estimates are mentioned on gaming websites IGN.com and the-magicbox.com.
24Ibid.
31content is usually available both in the Internet portals’ web-pages and through a
speciﬁed phone number. Netease, Sina, and Sohu are heavily reliant on revenues
from SMS provision: an average of 56% of revenue was from SMS-related services
for these three ﬁrms in 2003.25 The stock prices of these Internet portals have
appreciated tremendously since early 2002. Between January 2002 and July 2003,
Sohu, Sina, and Netease’s stock prices rose 33.67 times, 20.48 times and 49.78 times
respectively. Over the same period, the Nasdaq Composite Index declined by 12%.
All the Internet portals sign non-exclusive access contracts with China’s leading
mobile phone companies, China Mobile and China Unicom. China Mobile and
China Unicom have access to customer billing information and receive SMS usage
fees directly from cell phone subscribers, so Netease, Sina and Sohu rely on them
for fee collection. In return for the billing service, China Mobile and China Unicom
receive 15% of total SMS revenues.26
Given the industrial structure and the degree of compatibility in the Chinese
cell phone market, the non-exclusive contractual arrangement is consistent with
the must-have component model. First, China Mobile captures two-thirds of the
Chinese cell phone market, while China Unicom takes the remaining one-third.27
This market share diﬀerence was there even before the introduction of SMS. Thus,
it amounts to a ∆1 of 1/3 between the two wireless platforms. Second, China Mobile
and China Unicom are perfectly compatible in terms of voice calls (θ = 1). The
perfect-compatibility case from Section 3 predicts that, given high θ and relatively
low ∆1, the SMS providers will be more likely to oﬀer non-exclusive access contracts.
25Bambi Francisco, ”China Nets Have Priced in a Strong Q3,” CBS Market Watch, Oct. 7, 2003
26The ﬁrms’ annual reports give this information.
27Doug Young, “China Mobile Takes Unicom Market Share in Feb,” Reuters, March 29, 2004.
32The model suggests that a change in the popularity of the must-have component
(µ) has an impact on the transfer payment. However, it is diﬃcult to observe and
measure a change in µ in reality. The SMS market in China provides a testing ground
for this hypothesis since we can observe a drop in µ after the Chinese government
implemented content restrictions on Internet portals.
In August 2003, the Chinese government banned Internet users from paying for
certain services, mostly related to pornography, on their cell phones.28 This policy
eﬀectively reduced the popularity of the SMS, which was equivalent to a drop in
µ. According to the model, a decline in µ will increase the must-have component
provider’s transfer payments to the platforms in the non-exclusive access case.
Developments in the SMS industry following the content restriction policy con-
ﬁrm the above predictions. First, the cell phone carriers were believed to raise the
transfer payment, albeit in an indirect way. According to Paul Waide of Paciﬁc
Epoch, a research boutique focusing on China business, signs emerged in September
2003 that the wireless carriers were holding back SMS fees owed to the portals. It
was reported that China Mobile owed the leading portals nearly US$18.7 million.29
This was equivalent to a reduction of cash inﬂow in the Internet portals.
Second, since the Internet portals’ contracts with China Mobile and China Uni-
com would expire at various times from November 2003 to May 2004, Wall Street
grew concerned about the new contractual arrangement. Ethan McAfee, an Internet
analyst with hedge fund ﬁrm Capital Crossover Partners, warned in October 2003
that the cell phone carriers would have the power to ask for more favorable terms
28Bambi Francisco, “Is Netease Worth $2 Billion?” CBS Market Watch, October 29, 2003.
29Bambi Francisco, “China Portals Face Challenging Month,” CBS Market Watch, Oct. 1, 2003.
33during contractual re-negotiation.30
These concerns were immediately reﬂected in the three Internet portals’ share
prices. From August to December 2003, these stocks’ rising momentum came to a
full stop. Figure 5.3 shows that while the Nasdaq Composite Index rose by 13.96%,
Sohu and Netease declined by 19.56% and 3.52% respectively. Only Sina beat Nas-
daq by a modest 4.73%. Both industry news and the stock price movements tend
to conﬁrm the theoretical prediction.
6 Conclusion
This paper has combined strategic platforms, “must-have” component providers,
and bargaining in the platform-component paradigm. The major theoretical ﬁndings
can be summarized into three areas of inquiry.
In the area of platform competition, the model predicts: (i) In the exclusive
access case, the platform that has access to the must-have component experiences
higher sales, price and proﬁtability, whereas the platform that is denied access suﬀers
from lower sales, price and proﬁtability. (ii) In the non-exclusive access case, both
platforms enjoy higher sales, prices and proﬁtability as a result of a new must-have
component.
Regardless of the access mode, the predictions for the transfer payment are: (iii)
If the must-have component provider gains in popularity, then it will make a smaller
transfer payment to the platform(s). (iv) For any given platform market, the larger
the initial market share diﬀerence, the higher the transfer payment from the must-
have component provider to the platform(s). (v) The level of compatibility has an
30Paul R. La Monica, “The China Bubble,” CNN Money, October 23, 2003.
34ambiguous eﬀect on the transfer payment. We conjecture that in a growing platform
market, a higher level of compatibility is associated with a lower transfer payment,
while in a mature platform market it is associated with a higher transfer payment.
As for exclusivity, (vi) A must-have component provider is more likely to sign
an exclusive contract if the level of compatibility is low and the initial market share
diﬀerence between the platforms is high.
Given the fact that these theoretical results concern inter-party transfer pay-
ments and contractual arrangements, it is diﬃcult to test the hypotheses by using a
statistical method. But we showed that the model can shed light on three very dif-
ferent mini case studies. As a summary, the following table shows that the contracts
between the must-have component provider and the platform(s) in three diﬀerent
markets are arranged in the same way as predicted by the theory.
Market Must-Have Market Conditions Predicted Actual
Pay-TV (USA) ESPN Low ∆1 and High θ non-exclusive non-exclusive
Video Games (Japan) Final Fantasy High ∆1 and Low θ exclusive exclusive
Cell Phone (China) SMS Low ∆1 and High θ non-exclusive non-exclusive
This model suggests a key policy implication in indirect network industries – a
mandated increase in technological compatibility can induce the must-have compo-
nent provider to sign non-exclusive contracts with platforms. It has been common
knowledge, as CRT’s model implies, that an increase in platform compatibility is
often favorable for consumer welfare because it expands the number of components
available. Consumers who purchase the smaller platform will not lose severely if
compatibility is high. According to this traditional policy perspective, a regulatory
35mandate on technological compatibility has a direct, market-oriented impact.
The must-have component model adds a new result: technological compatibility
causes a contractual impact as well. The must-have component is more likely to
sign non-exclusive contracts under the perfect-compatibility regime than under the
zero-compatibility regime. This means that policies requiring greater technological
compatibility between platforms will encourage a contractual change towards non-
exclusivity between the platforms and the must-have component provider. In other
words, while the government may implement high-compatibility policies with the
intent opening technological standards, its eﬀect can spill over to the contractual
arena. Therefore, the must-have component model shows a “hidden” policy tool in
addition to standard disclosure requirements.
There are several directions for future research on must-have component bar-
gaining relations. One extension is a simultaneous bargaining framework that deals
with multiple must-have components. Our model is arguably capable of dealing with
multiple must-have components in a sequential game where must-have components
join the platforms one by one.31 But we expect that it is more typical for must-have
component providers to engage in a simultaneous jockeying for position on multiple
platforms. Empirical testing could consist of further case studies, and more of these
will continue to appear as new technologies arise. Ideally, it would be possible to
obtain enough data on enough separate cases to perform an econometric analysis.
31Each component will translate previous decisions into diﬀerent values of β1 and β2. The bar-
gaining process between the individual must-have component provider and the platforms is thus
the same as the single must-have component case.
36Appendix
Platform Operating Proﬁts in Alternative Cases
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If the must-have component is non-exclusively on both platforms, then we have
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> 0, the ﬁrst two terms must be positive.
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(θ,µ))
#
We need to decompose the terms in
∂TE
1
∂θ to delineate the three eﬀects θ has on
the platform-component contractual arrangement. The ﬁrst term is negative and
captures the fact that a higher θ reduces the initial market share diﬀerence between
the two platforms, thus reducing platform1’s bargaining power. The second and
third terms are negative and capture the fact that a higher θ expands the overall
38platform market and increases the must-have component provider’s opportunity cost
of going exclusive. The last four terms are positive and show the inverse relationship
between the level of compatibility and the must-have component quantity and price
eﬀects. A higher θ reduces the must-have component provider’s bargaining power.
Thus, the ﬁrst two eﬀects are negative, but the last is positive.
Solving for Simultaneous Bargaining with Non-exclusive Access
TNE
1 is the solution to (HNE
1 + TNE
1 ) − (HE
1 + TE
1 ) = ΠNE
µ − Π1E
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1 subject to the bargaining
constraint of (HNE
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1 ) ≥ 0.
TNE
2 is the solution to (HNE
2 + TNE
2 ) − (HE0
2 ) = ΠNE
µ − Π2E








1 subject to the bargaining constraint
of (HNE
2 + TNE
2 ) − (HE0
2 ) ≥ 0.
Substituting the values of TE
1 and TE
2 from Section 3 into the above equations
and simplifying gives the expressions in the text. It can be veriﬁed that both TNE
1
and TNE
2 pass their respective bargaining constraint tests.
Comparative Statics for non-exclusive Case

























The relationship between the popularity of the must-have component and the



























































∂µ which is negative. The second
term is negative, and so is the third, so the total transfer payments decrease in µ.










































































































































































The ﬁrst two terms equal zero because the partial derivatives are both zero
when β is held constant. Each term within the third and fourth terms is negative.
Therefore, the total transfer payments increase in ∆1.























































The signs of the second and third terms are both indeterminate, and so is the
overall relationship.
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